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I. INTRODUCTION
The Yale Law School's annual Middle East Legal Studies Seminar
brings together legal scholars and practitioners from North America and the
Middle East to address the most pressing challenges facing the region. In a
year filled with enormous political change-the aftermath of the Iraq war, the
death of Yasser Arafat, and the assassination of Rafik Hariri-this
Symposium on Nation-Building in the Middle East could not be more timely.
Seminar presentations touched on Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and
Palestine among others. Iraq, however, dominated discussion from the first
session to the last. For many, reflection on the justice and legality of nation-
building took place against the background of a graveyard, populated by as
many as one hundred thousand Iraqi casualties of the U.S. invasion. Others
rejoiced in the historic events of January 30, 2005, the final day of the
Seminar and by chance the day millions of Iraqis risked their lives to choose
their government. The discussion throughout the weekend was animated and
informed by these conflicting impulses toward optimism and despair.
The essays included in this Symposium--discussing constitutionalism,
economic development, and transitional justice-exemplify the diversity of
topics discussed and approaches employed by Seminar participants. Their
selection reflects limitations of space, as well as this journal's sense of its
mission and audience, rather than the quality of the presentations, which was
uniformly outstanding.
The Seminar was closed to the public, but it was preceded by an open
panel discussion on the future of Iraq. Noah Feldman argued that, in the
absence of a strong national identity, Iraq is best served by a federal system
that divides power among Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish regional governments.
Bernard Haykel responded that federalism will only entrench sectarian
division and allocate positions in government along ethnic and confessional
lines. Haykel's home country of Lebanon presents a striking example of a
nation in which governmental structures and functions reflect and perpetuate
the need to balance power among confessional groups: Sunnis, Shiites, Druze,
and Maronite Christians. An Iraqi state composed of three confederated
regional governments, composed along ethnic and sectarian lines, may not
only replicate but exacerbate the weaknesses of the Lebanese model, setting
the stage for conflict over land, water, oil, and other resources.
Haykel's pessimism was eclipsed, however, by Salem Chalabi, former
general director of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, who in the same public session
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indicated that ethnic cleansing may be an inevitable side-effect of the
reconstruction process. Chalabi's chilling assertion trades on the mistaken
view that mass violence arises from ancient hatreds beyond anyone's power to
eliminate or control. In every case of which we are aware, mass violence is
instigated and orchestrated by organized groups for the sake of their own
political power. In nations as varied as Congo, East Timor, India, Rwanda,
and Sierra Leone, these groups have included the government, the military,
political parties, paramilitary groups, religious organizations, private
corporations, and criminal gangs. These groups train, arm, and motivate
assailants; plan and lead assaults; block police and medical teams from scenes
of destruction; and bribe or co-opt state actors with the power and
responsibility to prevent and punish crime. Mass violence can arise in Iraq
only through the failure of the Iraqi government and of the United States to
identify and suppress groups that stand to gain from such violence. Repeated
invocation of discredited myths will not absolve those who ought to know
better.
II. TOWARD SAUDI CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
In an early intervention, Robert Post drew a helpful distinction between
nation-building and state-building, between the formation of the discursive
self-understanding of a people and the construction of positive legal
institutions that govern a territory. While state-building by an external actor
raises questions of morality and legality, nation-building by an external actor
raises questions of intelligibility. The stability of the state rests on the strength
of the nation, but it is not clear that an external actor can generate the social
solidarity among citizens required for a nation to arise and endure.
Abdulaziz Al-Fahad paints a striking portrait of state power mediated
not by legal institutions but -by custom and national tradition. Al-Fahad's
essay challenges the received wisdom that Middle Eastern nations have
constitutions-written legal documents-but lack constitutionalism-customs
and practices that effectively constrain state power.' Al-Fahad observes that
Saudi Arabia's Basic Law does not even pretend to restrict the power of the
executive, and he argues that before oil rents insulated the rulers from the
ruled, custom and practice had provided the only operative limits on state
authority. The current constitutional reform movement seeks to establish a
new compact based on traditional Saudi customs and values. Thus, as Post
would suggest, the discursive self-understanding of the Saudi nation not only
provides the foundation of the Saudi state but also polices its outer bounds.
Al-Fahad traces the growth of popular pressure for constitutional reform
in contemporary Saudi Arabia. He introduces the reader to traditional
constraints on royal power, discusses past reform efforts and their failures,
and identifies distinctive features of the current constitutional moment. While
earlier periods of constitutionalist agitation were driven or catalyzed by
external pressures, the current movement is entirely homegrown, and this, he
1. The received view is given its most eloquent expression in NATHAN BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD (2001). Brown argues that Arab constitutions
organize but do not constrain state power. These constitutions, therefore, often facilitate autocratic rule.
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argues, is its greatest source of strength. The movement is representative of
Saudi society, including people from all regions of the country, all religious
sects, and even members of the Wahhabi religious establishment.
Saudi Arabia's new reformers hope to amend the Basic Law to limit
more effectively the power of the king and to hold political authorities
accountable for their actions. They seek a new dialogue between rulers and
subjects, a participatory politics in which citizen grievances are channeled
through a consultative, negotiated process. Al-Fahad's reformers are pro-
accountability, but not necessarily pro-democracy. They want their country to
remain faithful to its traditions and customs, and do not necessarily think that
Western-style mass constitutional democracy fits their needs. The reformists
seek to craft a more effective rule of law, but they decline to duplicate
Western forms of governance.
The goal of the reformist agitation is the creation of a forum and a
climate that both encourage and enable participatory politics. A1-Fahad sees
the ruling family's increasingly autocratic tendencies as a main source of
popular discontent, and contrasts their practices with the degrees of
participation allowed under King Abd al-Aziz fifty years ago. His recurrent
theme is that of participatory politics, but it remains unclear whether Al-Fahad
sees participatory politics as a transcendent political value, as a religious
imperative, or as an instrument of governance that provides an outlet for
popular dissatisfaction.
It is often hard for the reader to share AI-Fahad's optimism for
successful reform, particularly after he explains that the 1992 Basic Law was
drafted in secrecy without the consultation of elites or public debate, and that
it makes no allusions to popular sovereignty or participatory political rights.
Yet he sees the Saudi Basic law as the first offer in a protracted negotiation
between the monarchy and domestic reformers. He describes the historic
events that have occurred subsequent to its passage, noting tangible steps the
royal family has taken to show its commitment to developing a new political
framework. AI-Fahad points to public petitions received openly by the
government-as opposed to the traditional norm of private consultation with
dissenters-as well as a series of nationwide dialogues on contentious social
and political issues-including women's rights and freedom of expression-
as evidence of substantial steps toward reform.
Finally, Al-Fahad points to more tangible restraints on power within the
Basic Law to show that an organic process of state reform is in fact possible.
The Basic Law establishes shariah as the only substantial constraint on the
power of the executive. Classical Islam posits a bifurcation of political power
between an executive/legislative branch and a judicial branch that exercises a
strong form of judicial review.2 The king may write any law he chooses, but
judges may enforce only those laws they find compliant with shariah.3 Since
shariah courts have comprehensive jurisdiction over all civil and criminal
matters, Saudi Arabia may come to serve as an interesting case study in how
2. For an excellent discussion of how Islamic judges historically operated as a constraint on
political power, see SHERMAN JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE (1996).
3. Al-Qarafi's writings echo this sentiment: "not everything that issues from a caliph, sultan,
or other government official constitutes a binding decree." Id. at 196.
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shariah functions as a meaningful constraint on political authorities in the
modem world.
III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FROM THE INSIDE OUT OR THE OUTSIDE IN?
While Al-Fahad argues that religion, culture, and history play a crucial
role in meaningful and effective constitutional reform, Ian Ayres and Jonathan
R. Macey claim that the causal contributions of those same factors to
economic underdevelopment in the Middle East have been overstated. The
authors first disentangle issues of macroeconomics from those of
microeconomics, and insist that policymakers should focus their energies on
microeconomic determinants of growth. Here they echo Peruvian economist
Hemando de Soto, whose pioneering work examines legal impediments to the
economic empowerment of the world's poor.4 De Soto argues that legal
regulation often stifles entrepreneurial activity and forces the poor into an
informal, extra-legal economy, inhibiting their ability to develop their assets
into active capital.
Ayres and Macey redirect the attention of policy reformers from the
complex task of creating the macro components of a robust capitalist economy
(such as protections for creditors and capital market formation) to the task of
crafting regulations that better promote entrepreneurial activity, particularly
business creation itself. Ayres and Macey advocate the promotion of risk-
taking by small entrepreneurs through the limited liability corporate form.
What distinguishes Ayres and Macey's approach from conventional neoliberal
critiques of regulation is their call for reforms to promote small businesses.
They see small business as the cornerstone of economic growth, pointing out
that even in the United States small businesses account for 99% of all
employers. Ayres and Macey focus on domestic small business and
distinguish reforms that target domestic firms from those that support foreign
investors and multinational corporations. Even those who disagree with
neoliberal economic policies can sympathize with efforts to level the playing
field for small businesspersons in the developing world by eliminating
regulations that block the poor from gaining legal protections for their
businesses. Ayres and Macey share with de Soto a recognition that people
who want to create businesses may be dissuaded by bureaucratic hurdles to
registration. The question lingers whether this cultural shift can also help
enable economic growth in countries with largely agrarian, rural economies.
Ayres and Macey contend that the true stumbling block to economic
reform in the Middle East is a divergence between the incentives of rulers and
entrenched elites and the interests of potential entrepreneurs. Economic
liberalization, they argue, will have a democratizing effect and will thereby
threaten the power of political and economic insiders. At times, their analysis
4. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).
5. Importantly, de Soto sees the poor as deeply entrepreneurial, with all the skills needed to
start and manage successful businesses. Legal recognition of these assets is essential to empowering the
poor in a number of developing countries. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 243 (1989) ("In Peru,
informality has turned a large number of people into entrepreneurs, into people who know how to seize
opportunities by managing available resources, including their own labour, relatively efficiently ... This
new business class is a very valuable resource: it is the human capital essential for economic takeoff.").
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seems to conflate the sociological dynamic of new elites emerging and
gaining power with the political dynamics of democracy, decentralization, and
enhanced equality of opportunity. An emergent middle class will not
necessarily want to share power with other social groups. Amy Chua's recent
work has shown that the interests of the business class do not necessarily align
with those of democratic reformers, and oftentimes the business class may
even be directly opposed to democratization. 6 Similarly, Ayres and Macey
argue that corporations can be a powerfil democratizing agent particularly
because they permit decentralized capital formation that circumvents
established elites. Their analysis, however, ignores the role of corporations as
self-interested political actors. Due to this distinction between the economic
and political effects of corporations, the corporate form might facilitate
societal power-sharing without promoting democracy as such.
The authors seek to craft policy from the perspective of the potential
entrepreneur, leading them to ignore the effects of international legal regimes
on economic growth. While country-specific factors explain variation within
the group of developing nations, global factors nonetheless partly explain the
performance of the group as a whole. As Thomas Pogge observes,
international legal rules undermine development efforts in a variety of ways,
including trade protectionism, inadequate controls on bribery and corruption,
and a dearth of accountability standards for natural resources management.
7
International law grants to those in effective control of a given country the
legal power to transfer the country's resources, a global factor especially
relevant to the oil-rich nations of the Middle East . This international resource
privilege drives both the rentier state phenomenon and the striking negative
correlation between resource wealth and economic performance. The two
consequences are of course related: the former is the cause and the latter the
effect of the relative absence throughout the developing world of democratic
governments that design economic policies with an eye to the common
good.10
Ayres and Macey's placement of domestic small business at the heart of
the economic growth story laudably reasserts the agency of developing
6. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003).
7. See Thomas Pogge, 'Assisting' the Global Poor, in THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE:
MORALITY AND THE DISTANT NEEDY 260 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004).
8. This international resource privilege has disastrous effects in poor but resource-
rich countries .... Whoever can take power in such a country by whatever means can
maintain his rule, even against widespread popular opposition, by buying the arms and
soldiers he needs with revenues from the export of national resources and with funds
borrowed against future resource sales.
Pogge, supra note 7, at 270 ("The resource privilege .... also gives outsiders strong incentives to
corrupt the officials of such countries who, no matter how badly they rule, continue to have resources to
sell and money to spend").
9. For examples including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, see U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 278-81 (2003), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdrO3_complete.pdf.
10. Leonard Wantehekon, Why do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian
Governments?, 5 J. AFR. FIN. & ECON. DEV. 557 (2002); Ricky Lam & Leonard Wantchekon, Political
Dutch Disease (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/wantchekon/research/lr-
04-10.pdf.
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nations seeking to control their own destiny. It remains to be seen whether
macroeconomic internationalist or microeconomic domestic variables will
determine future economic growth.
IV. TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE IRAQI STATE
Ash BAli's primary concern is with the development of durable,
effective, and legitimate legal institutions, which she argues will be inhibited
by the poor example provided by both Saddam Hussein and U.S. occupation
forces. Bfili's predictive claims have sadly been vindicated. The U.S. State
Department reports that abuses by Iraqi officials include "arbitrary deprivation
of life, torture, impunity, poor prison conditions-particularly in pretrial
detention facilities-and arbitrary arrest and detention," as well as "unlawful
arrests, beatings, and the theft of valuables from the homes of persons who
were detained."' 1 Bfili rightly lists reform and oversight of police, prisons, and
the judiciary among the most pressing tasks facing the nascent government.
Bali's second, and in some ways deeper point is that troop withdrawal
and free elections conceal longer-lasting economic mechanisms of foreign
control put in place behind the veneer of Iraqi self-determination. As she
points out, the United States has sold off large areas of the Iraqi economy to
U.S. corporations. Any attempt by the new government to reclaim these areas
may be met with severe economic reprisals by the United States as well as by
transnational organizations such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund.' Bali's position contrasts sharply with that of Noah Feldman,
who argues that the special moral obligations owed by the United States to
Iraq essentially end with the current military occupation and the transfer of
effective territorial control to a domestic security force adequate to its task.
13
The convenience of Feldman's view from the perspective of the United States
is the first and perhaps the best reason to question its validity.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Iraq, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2004,
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41722.htm (Feb. 28, 2005) ("There was a
widespread perception that police made false arrests to extort money."). See also Human Rights Watch,
The New Iraq?: Torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Iraqi custody 4 (Jan. 2005), http://hrw.org/-
reports/2005/iraq05/iraqO105.pdf:
Human Rights Watch investigations in Iraq found the systematic use of arbitrary arrest,
prolonged pre-trial detention without judicial review, torture and ill-treatment of
detainees, denial of access by families and lawyers to detainees, improper treatment of
detained children, and abysmal conditions in pre-trial detention facilities. Trials are
marred by inadequate legal representation and the acceptance of coerced confessions as
evidence. Persons tortured or mistreated have inadequate access to health care and no
realistic avenue for legal redress. With rare exception, Iraqi authorities have failed to
investigate and punish officials responsible for violations. International police advisers,
primarily U.S. citizens funded through the United States, have turned a blind eye to these
rampant abuses.
12. The recent nomination of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to the presidency of
the World Bank does little to alleviate concern that international financial policy tracks U.S. foreign
policy and national self-interest. Bush backs US hawk for World Bank, BBC, Mar. 17, 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/-4354839.stm; Paul Blustein & Peter Baker, Wolfowitz Picked for
World Bank: Bush Nominee for Chief Faces Opposition Overseas, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at Al.
13. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHIcs OF NATION-BUILDING 127-
28, 130 (2004).
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Bali's policy proposals reflect her broadly juridical approach to justice
and accountability, one that contrasts sharply with Feldman's reliance on
political checks and balances. Feldman argues that the U.S. occupation of Iraq
can be justified if the two nations stand to one another as trustee to
beneficiary. 14 Feldman proposes political mechanisms to monitor the
occupying power in the absence of legal remedies. The occupied may
constrain the occupier to act in the former's interests through vigorous
exercise of freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, and by exploiting the
occupier's need for cooperation from local elites. 15 Bali does not share
Feldman's taste for counterfactuals; she views the forced restructuring of
Iraq's economy as proof that the United States has subordinated Iraqi interests
to its own. Bali advocates legal remedies the absence of which Feldman
presumes, and she suggests ways to integrate them into a transitional regime.
She argues that insulating U.S. activities in Iraq from civil suit and criminal
prosecution merely confirms a suspicion that still lingers on two years after
the fall of Saddam: that talk of justice merely masks "the interest of the
stronger."
16
Feldman's conception of accountability is essentially forward-looking, a
matter of ensuring ongoing convergence of interests among governors and
governed. Bali's conception of accountability is essentially backward-looking,
a matter of attributing responsibility for and crafting responses to past wrongs.
Feldman avoids discussion of the legality and morality of the invasion,
preferring to let bygones be bygones and look to the future.17 Bali, by contrast,
frames her analysis against a backdrop of perceived injustice the taint of
which must be lifted before a legitimate state can arise. We suspect Bali has
the better of the argument. The future has an unfortunate habit of becoming
the past, and it makes little sense to treat the rights of others as of paramount
importance until the moment of their violation, and thereafter treat those
violations as sunk costs. Duties of mutual restraint and reasonable care do not
disappear upon their breach; the interests that ground them give rise upon their
infringement to further duties of repair and, in appropriate cases, liability to
punishment. t8 Accounts must be settled lest the new Iraqi state take its first
steps over the victims of U.S. nation-building efforts.
14. Curiously, Feldman himself notes that the analogy "cannot succeed" in part because the
trust is not created by the rightful settlor, whom Feldman properly identifies as "[t]he people
themselves." FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 64. Rather, the relevant assets are seized by the occupying
power. Nor, as he notes, are the beneficiaries "authorized to come into court and challenge the trustee's
management." Id. at 66.
15. Id. at66-67.
16. PLATO, REPUBLIC 338C.
17. FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 4-5.
18. We owe this characterization of the relationship between primary and remedial duties to
Jules Coleman.
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